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2 Id., Article 40.2. There is no suggestion that this list is exhaustive; on the contrary, Article 40.2 is explicitly couched in non-exhaustive terms (i.e. the Agreement states only that such practices "may include" the practices mentioned). 3 The competition-related provisions of the TRIPS Agreement, while representing an essential element of balance in the Agreement, also leave important questions unanswered.
For example, they do not define the basis on which practices may be deemed to be anticompetitive -i.e. the evaluative standards to be employed. The full set of practices that may be deemed anti-competitive (beyond the three examples mentioned) is left undefined. The Agreement also provides little in the way of guidance regarding the remedies that may be adopted in particular cases, beyond making clear that any measures adopted must be consistent with other provisions of the Agreement. 4 Whether the lack of guidance provided by the TRIPS Agreement regarding these questions is a problem can be debated. Frederick Abbott, for one, argues that the broad discretion for governments in the design and implementation of competition policies vis-à-vis intellectual property that results from the wording of the current provisions serves the best interests of developed and developing countries alike and, therefore, that no amendment to the Agreement or development of parallel rules on anti-competitive practices in relation to IP is warranted. 5 However, even if no amendment to the TRIPS Agreement as such or development of parallel binding rules is deemed to be desirable or feasible in the current circumstances, there could be merit in a policy analysis and development exercise at the multilateral level to consider the relationship between competition policy and intellectual property rights. The question of possible guidelines -whether of a binding or non-binding nature -could be addressed in that context. Certainly, there are reasons for believing that there are costs associated with the dearth of guidance for WTO Member countries regarding the optimal application of competition policy in this area (see detailed discussion in Part III, below). In brief, the application of competition policy vis-à-vis intellectual property is one of the more complex and technically challenging sub-fields of such policy. In the absence of appropriate guidance, WTO Members lacking experience, particularly developing countries, may well find it difficult to implement appropriate enforcement policies in this area. In addition, as will be elaborated below, there are potential negative externalities or spillovers associated with differing national standards in this area. For example, remedies imposed in one jurisdiction may impinge on behaviour (and potentially on economic welfare) in other jurisdictions. A particularly acute example of this concern relates to situations in which remedies imposed in one jurisdiction require the sharing of proprietary information. In such cases, it may be difficult to prevent the information disclosed (or products manufactured using such information) from "leaking" across borders. 6 To be sure, even if it is deemed desirable to provide additional guidance for WTO Members regarding these questions, it may not be possible to agree on appropriate standards to govern all practices in all situations. Although approaches to the competition policyintellectual property interface in major developed jurisdictions have undergone a degree of convergence in recent years and a number of useful guidelines on national enforcement policies are available for reference, 7 there remain important residual differences even as between the US and the European Community. 8 In the past, even greater divergences have been evident between developed and developing countries regarding issues in this area. 9 It is important, however, not to be defeatist regarding these differences and the consequent scope "inactive" -is also, very much, of interest in this regard. The application of competition policy vis-à-vis intellectual property rights was an important focus of the Group in the initial years of its work.
11 As discussed in this chapter, the record of those discussions suggests that the state of international thinking has progressed since the more extreme divergences of the past and that there may be more scope than is commonly realized for further work on fostering common approaches among WTO Member countries in this area, centred around sound economic principles.
This chapter reflects on these questions and possibilities. The intention is not to provide a definitive answer to the question of what kind of guidance is needed or to take particular positions on current enforcement issues, but to illuminate the need for guidance and some of the issues that would need to be addressed. The overall perspective of the chapter is 10 that, in the long run, there will clearly be a need for greater international coordination in this area. This reflects both the technical challenges for enforcement policy and the potential negative spillovers from a lack of international coordination that are noted above. However, agreement on common standards will not be easy. In the short run, there is a need for renewed international dialogue and reflection on issues concerning the interface of competition policy and intellectual property. Such dialogue should include but not be limited to competition specialists and should take account of recent economic learning and lessons from national enforcement experience in addition to past discussions at the international level, including in the WTO. The scope for resulting guidance and whether such guidance would be of a voluntary nature or otherwise are questions that could be assessed in the scope of such discussions.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Part II outlines the existing competition policy-related provisions of the TRIPS Agreement, noting in particular the questions that these provisions leave unanswered and the significance of these questions. 
II. THE COMPETITION POLICY PROVISIONS OF THE TRIPS
AGREEMENT: FLEXIBILITY PROVIDED AND QUESTIONS
UNANSWERED 12
The area of intellectual property rights is an important example of a sphere in which the role of competition policy is already directly reflected in an existing WTO Agreement, 11 See Report (1998) The existence of the foregoing provisions reflects a concern articulated by some countries, especially developing countries, during the negotiation of the Agreement that the various commitments regarding standards of protection for intellectual property that are embodied therein be balanced by a recognition of the right of Members to take appropriate measures to address resulting abuses. 17 They provide broad discretion to WTO Member governments to implement competition policy remedies in regard to anti-competitive licensing and other practices. As such, they represent an important aspect of the flexibility that is built into the Agreement.
As pointed out in the Introduction to this chapter, however, the foregoing provisions leave unanswered a number of important questions. For example, they do not define the basis on which practices may be deemed to be anti-competitive -i.e. the evaluative standards to be employed. In addition, the full set of practices that may be deemed anti-competitive (beyond the three examples mentioned) is left undefined. 18 The Agreement also provides little in the way of guidance regarding the remedies that may be adopted in particular cases, beyond making clear that any measures adopted must be consistent with other provisions of 16 Specifically, those contained in paragraphs (b) and (f) of Article 31. 17 See discussion in World Trade Organization 1997, above note 3, at pp. 72-74. 18 The latter might not be a problem if the evaluative criteria were specified. It is not uncommon, in domestic statutes, to provide an open-ended illustrative list of acts that are covered by a particular provision.
the Agreement. Presumably, one implication of the latter limitation is that the remedy of compulsory licensing cannot be imposed other than in a manner consistent with the provisions of Article 31.
III. THE NEED FOR FURTHER GUIDANCE FOR WTO MEMBERS IN THIS
AREA: TECHNICAL CHALLENGES, POLICY LEGITIMACY, AVOIDING OVERLY SWEEPING APPROACHES AND INTERNATIONAL
COORDINATION ISSUES
As noted in the Introduction to this chapter, there may be advantages as well as disadvantages to the lack of guidance provided by the TRIPS Agreement on the matters identified in the preceding section. Abbott, in particular, argues that the broad discretion for governments in the design and implementation of competition policies vis-à-vis intellectual
property that results from the wording of the current provisions serves the best interests of developed and developing countries alike. 19 However, even if no amendment to the TRIPS Agreement as such or development of parallel binding rules is deemed to be desirable or feasible in the current circumstances, there are reasons for believing that the current situation is not optimal, and that ways need to be found to provide additional guidance for WTO Members in this area. This part of the chapter considers these reasons. The form that further guidance would take -i.e. whether it might be of a binding or non-binding nature -is a question that could be addressed at a later stage.
(1) Facilitating desirable competition policy interventions vis-à-vis intellectual property licensing and other abuses
The application of competition policy vis-à-vis intellectual property is undeniably one of the more complex and technically challenging sub-fields of such policy. It has taken decades for the major jurisdictions applying competition policy in this area (principally the US, the EC, Japan and Canada) to develop the relevant analytical tools and approaches.
Therefore, while respecting the right and possible interest of developing countries to follow different approaches, it is important to recognize the practical difficulties that they face in developing and putting into place any approach at all. This is particularly so in regard to antiHowever, in view of the lack of evaluative criteria/defining principles, the open-ended nature of the set of anticompetitive practices could result in arbitrary application of the authority provided in Article 40.2.
competitive practices that are transnational in nature (e.g. anti-competitive clauses in international licensing agreements). An obvious way forward is to examine the approaches that have been adopted in regimes with active policies in this area, in conjunction with relevant legal and economic literature, and to consider the adoption of policy approaches. A policy that simply preserves all options in this area may well be synonymous with a policy of non-intervention in regard to IP licensing and other abuses.
For greater precision, the competition authorities of the US, the EC, Canada and Japan have all adopted more or less comprehensive guidelines or other policy statements setting out the analytical and other approaches that they take toward licensing and other IP abuses. 20 Of course, each of these instruments has its own particularities reflecting its institutional and policy context. Of course, none of them purports to represent "the final word" on the optimal application of competition policy vis-à-vis intellectual property. In fact, these instruments are all subject to occasional updates/revision to take account of new learning and policy developments. They nonetheless represent highly useful syntheses of enforcement approaches that both provide guidance to firms and facilitate policy application by responsible officials. As such, they are an essential point of reference for international reflection and for jurisdictions with less experience in this area. Field-of-use, territorial, and other limitations on intellectual property licenses may serve pro-competitive ends by allowing the licensor to exploit its property as efficiently and effectively as possible. These various forms of exclusivity can be used to give a licensee an incentive to invest in the commercialization and distribution of products embodying the licensed intellectual property and to develop additional applications for the licensed property. The restrictions may do so, for example, by protecting the licensee against free-riding on the licensee's investments by other licensees or by the licensor. They may also increase the licensor's incentive to license, for example, by protecting the licensor from competition in the licensor's own technology in a market niche that it prefers to keep to itself.
22
Recognition of the potential pro-competitive benefits of licensing and other vertical practices is not an invention of contemporary competition agencies; it is a basic tenet of modern industrial organization economics.
23
The fact that licensing and other vertical practices can serve legitimate procompetitive purposes cautions against excessive reliance on per se rules in regard to such practices. Recognizing this, for the past two decades or more competition agencies have progressively eschewed such rules in favour of case-by-case or "rule of reason" treatment of such practices. Helping countries to avoid the self-inflicted harm caused by excessively rigid or sweeping rules is another possible benefit of a comparative assessment or policy development exercise encompassing these issues at the multilateral level. "The U.S. experience tells us that the best antitrust remedies eliminate impediments to the healthy functioning of competitive markets without hindering successful competitors or imposing burdens on third parties, which may result from the EC's remedy. Possibly, the answers can be found in further international discussions aimed at fostering intellectual consensus on the substantive issues involved. However, the potential for conflict in cases of abuses of intellectual property rights (or abuses of a dominant position involving intellectual property rights, particularly as a remedy) at least raises the possibility that something more than this -i.e. a system of international coordination, whether voluntary or otherwise -will eventually be needed.
IV. ISSUES THAT MIGHT BE ADDRESSED IN A POSSIBLE INTERNATIONAL GUIDELINE/POLICY-MAKING EXERCISE
This section of the chapter sets out some specific issues on which international reflection and (possibly) coordination may be desirable. The list of issues derives from the guidelines that have been issued by the competition authorities of the major jurisdictions having experience in this area, and related enforcement experience and jurisprudence. Some of the issues noted concern the basic approach and coverage of competition law vis-à-vis intellectual property; others involve particular practices of current interest. Where possible, an effort is made to identify international coordination problems that may arise in relation to the issues and categories of conduct discussed in addition to the basic questions of enforcement policy. The potential international coordination problems identified (particularly in regard to the treatment of licensing issues, pooling, anti-competitive patent settlements and refusals to licence) reinforce the case for further discussion of these issues in appropriate international fora.
A.
THE BASIC ROLE OF COMPETITION POLICY VIS-À-VIS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
A premise common to the guidelines of major jurisdictions with experience in this area is that, at least at a broad level, the protection of IPRs per se is not inconsistent with the goals of competition policy. Rather, if properly designed and administered, IPRs strengthen competition in the long run by providing incentives for the development and production of new products and production processes and by facilitating technology transfer. • The extent and availability of substitutes for the products and (existing or future) technologies in question (a basic determinant of market power).
• Implications of the arrangements in question for market power, coordination of pricing or output, and foreclosure of access to inputs.
• The extent to which they impose exclusivity.
• The extent of rivalry and the pace of innovation in the markets affected.
• Possible efficiencies resulting from the arrangement.
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A case-by-case approach to the treatment of licensing practices may strike some as unduly permissive or lenient. 36 In the past, some developing countries have advocated a stricter approach. An unduly strict or per se approach is likely, however, to be self-defeating.
Sweeping prohibition of restrictive practices in international licensing agreements would raise the costs and/or reduce the incentives for technology owners to enter into voluntary arrangements that are generally pro-competitive and are an important vehicle for international technology transfer. This does not, however, imply that restrictive licensing arrangements should be immune from scrutiny; rather, the suggestion is simply that such scrutiny should be carried out using the market power and other screens and tests that are suggested by relevant economic literature and case experience.
37
Where licensing arrangements are international in scope, the application of competition law in this area can clearly give rise to international coordination problems. In the absence of "comity" or similar considerations, where a particular licensing arrangement is subject to the competition laws of two or more jurisdictions, the arrangement could be deemed illegal under laws of the jurisdiction taking the "strictest" approach notwithstanding that it would be tolerated or even deemed desirable under the approach of the other jurisdiction. 35 See also Anderson and Heimler, above note 24. 36 Abbott, in particular, emphasizes that, in his view, section 40 of the TRIPS Agreement permits per se prohibition of licensing practices. Abbott, above note 3. 37 
D. ISSUES CONCERNING PATENT THICKETS AND POOLING
Another important issue meriting attention in any international policy development exercise or guideline is that of patent thickets and pooling. Patent thickets are situations in which an overlapping set of patent rights requires firms seeking to commercialize new technology to obtain licenses from multiple patentees. For example, a single semi-conductor product can be potentially subject to hundreds or thousands of patents. The impact of patent thickets is heightened by the risk of "hold-ups" -that is, the danger that new products will inadvertently infringe on patents issued after the products were designed. 38 Patent pools and/or cross-licensing can be an efficient response to these phenomena in many cases, although they can also raise antitrust concerns. A key insight, in this regard, is that pools combining complementary patents are generally efficiency-enhancing; whereas pools comprised of substitute patents can indeed create market power and are a legitimate focus of antitrust concern.
39 Why might it eventually prove necessary to treat the issue of patent thickets and pooling in an international guideline or policy development exercise, as opposed to merely addressing it at the national level? The answer is that pools raise, potentially in acute form, the international coordination issues flagged above. If particular pools or cross-licensing arrangements are permitted in one jurisdiction but not in another, spillovers are likely to arise.
E. THE TREATMENT OF PATENT SETTLEMENTS
Another important issue that is highlighted by recent enforcement experience in developed jurisdictions concerns anti-competitive "settlements" in patent infringement cases that thwart entry by generic competitors. This possibility is likely to be of particular concern in situations where public policy seeks to facilitate entry by generic competitors. As Majoras explains, under the relevant US legislation:
"In nearly any case in which generic entry is contemplated, the profit that the generic anticipates will be much less than the profit the brand-name drug company would make from the same sales. Consequently, it will often be more profitable for the branded manufacturer to buy off generics."
40
Of course, "buying off" potential generic competitors is likely to be strongly contrary to the interests of consumers.
As part of the global response to current public health emergencies, recently the TRIPS Agreement has been amended to facilitate generic production of pharmaceutical medicines for countries affected by such crises. 41 It is important that this policy not be undercut by anti-competitive settlements between brand-name and generic drug companies.
Accordingly, this issue could be an important focus of international deliberations regarding the interface of competition policy and intellectual property.
F.
REFUSALS TO LICENSE
An additional issue on which it may be difficult to achieve full convergence is that of refusals to license intellectual property rights. In the European Community, the Magill TV 42 and IMS Health 43 cases have made clear that such refusals can indeed violate relevant competition law provisions, depending on the circumstances and, in particular, on whether they impede the development of new products. On the other hand, in the US, there is a strong or, in the view of many commentators, absolute presumption that patentholders are entitled to refuse to license their patented inventions (the situation is less clear with respect to copyright). 44 Independent of views concerning which side in this debate is "right", the treatment of refusals clearly poses stark problems of international policy coordination: where technology is made available by compulsory licence in one jurisdiction (despite possible opposing views in another jurisdiction), it will be difficult to prevent it from "leaking" across borders. 48 This report provides a penetrating discussion of the harmful effects on competition that can flow from the awarding of unjustified patents (or patents that are cast in overly broad terms), and puts forward a range of proposals to address these problems.
Affirming the importance of such activities in relation to intellectual property could be another valuable contribution of a international guideline or policy development exercise relating to competition policy and intellectual property at the multilateral level. positive interest in the subject and wider understanding of competition policy concepts and tools. 54 The subject of the relationship between intellectual property rights and competition policy was an important focus of the WTO Working Group in the early years of its work.
The debates on this issue contain many elements relevant to possible further work in this subject-area at the multilateral level. For example, the discussion took as a point of departure the recognition that competition policy can be an important factor in balancing the rights of producers under intellectual property legislation, and in counteracting particular abuses thereof. The debate recognized both the costs entailed by overly strict enforcement policies and regulations in the area of technology licensing and the dangers of an overly lax approach.
The Working Group also took note of the evolution that has taken place in the enforcement policies of WTO Members with experience in this area, and attached importance to this as a basis for further analysis. 55 Some additional highlights of the Working Group's deliberations on this subject are as follows:
• There was wide acknowledgement that competition laws are necessary to prevent abusive practices and ensure that interfirm rivalry is not restricted to an extent beyond that intended by the intellectual property laws, and thereby that the market assigns a fair and efficient value to such property.
56
• The discussion in the Working Group recognized that the availability of substitutes for goods and technologies covered by IPRs is an empirical question to be determined on a case-by-case basis. 57 As noted above, this is a base-line assumption of 54 For example, William Kolasky, then US Deputy Assistant Attorney-General for Antitrust and by no means an advocate of WTO competition rules, has stated as follows: "Over the years, we have been told that our WTO papers -dealing with issues like technical assistance, building a culture of competition, and establishing antitrust priorities -have been of enormous help to countries that are in the process of establishing an antitrust regime. economics-based approaches to antitrust analysis in this area. 58 Further, even if the intellectual property right concerned generates market power, the right holder's behaviour might not necessarily constitute an abuse of a dominance.
• There was a general recognition that licensing arrangements are normally procompetitive and are an important vehicle for technology transfer. Where an individual licensing practice needs to be examined, this should normally be done on a case-bycase or "rule of reason" basis by which the pro-competitive benefits are weighed against anti-competitive effects.
59
• Consistent with the above, the point was made that the proper application of competition law should avoid both excessively stringent enforcement approaches, which can lessen innovation, and the weak or ineffective application of such law, leading to the abuse of market power. Either approach can have an adverse effect on output as well as an inhibiting effect on trade.
60
• The view was also expressed that more attention should be paid to ensuring that the intellectual property rights themselves are underpinned by sound competition principles and that they promote global welfare. Over-protection of intellectual property rights can contribute to the entrenchment of horizontal and vertical restraints, for example through patent pooling among competitors and the restriction of parallel imports. Some Members suggested, further, that future negotiations in the area of intellectual property rights should give equal weight to recognizing the risks of both under-and over-protection of intellectual property rights. Under this approach, advocates of higher levels of protection would be required to demonstrate empirically that the changes they proposed are likely to increase global welfare.
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• The point was made that the TRIPS Agreement itself reflects the view that regimes for the protection of intellectual property rights should be balanced by safeguards 58 intended to restrain anti-competitive practices involving the use of intellectual property rights. Some Members stated explicitly that the relevant provisions of TRIPS provide insufficient guidance on the practices that should be treated as abuses and the remedies that would be appropriate, and that more guidance in this area would be useful.
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In sum, the discussion of the interface between competition policy and intellectual property rights in the WTO Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy was both wide-ranging and penetrating. The discussion delved into matters such as the objectives of intellectual property laws and their relation to those of competition policy; the potential efficiency benefits of "restrictive" licensing arrangements; the evolution of Member states' competition enforcement policies in this area and the reasons for such evolution; and the implications for economic welfare of the practice of international market segmentation through intellectual property rights. In key respects, the discussion in the Working Group paralleled the evolution of scholarly thinking in this area. As such, it may provide more of a basis for further work in this area than has hitherto been recognized. For example, they do not define the basis on which practices may be deemed to be anti- undefined. The Agreement also provides little in the way of guidance regarding the remedies that may be adopted in particular cases, beyond making clear that any measures adopted must be consistent with other provisions of the Agreement. These gaps heighten the technical challenges for WTO Members in putting the provisions to good use and also raise potential international coordination problems. For example, remedies imposed in one jurisdiction may impinge or be felt to impinge on behaviour and on economic welfare in other jurisdictions.
The potential for such problems has already been seen in international tensions relating to remedies imposed in the various Microsoft cases. Even if no amendment to the TRIPS Agreement as such or development of parallel binding rules is deemed to be called for to address these issues, there could be merit in a policy analysis and development exercise at the multilateral level to consider the relationship between competition policy and intellectual property rights.
Of course, even if it is deemed desirable to provide additional guidance for WTO Members regarding these questions, it may not be possible to agree on appropriate standards to govern all practices in all situations. Although approaches to the competition policyintellectual property interface in major developed jurisdictions have undergone a degree of convergence in recent years, there remain important residual differences particularly as between the US and the European Community. It is important, however, not to be defeatist regarding these differences and the consequent scope for development of policies that would enhance global welfare. Even if it is not possible to agree on standards to govern all anticompetitive practices relating to IP in all cases, there could well be gains from a further exchange of views on issues in this area, in an appropriate international forum.
Experience in the WTO Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and
Competition Policy is of interest in this regard. The application of competition policy vis-à-vis intellectual property rights was an important focus of the Group in the initial years of its work. As discussed in this chapter, the record of those discussions suggests that the state of international thinking has progressed since the more extreme divergences of the past and that there may be more scope than is commonly realized for further work on fostering common approaches among WTO Member countries in this area, centred around sound economic principles. 63 See, for a more comprehensive discussion, Anderson, above note 3.
In any event, for all the reasons discussed in this paper, it seems likely that issues at the interface of intellectual property rights and competition policy will be a growing source of interest and possible international tensions in the years to come. Consequently, what today may seem impossible (i.e. a renewed discussion of these issues in the WTO) might yet come to pass.
